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Abstract 
 In 2008, leading U.S. counties adopted innovative treatment courts specializing in the 
unique needs of veterans with substance abuse and other legal issues. Since then, pro-veteran 
advocacy has aided in the continued diffusion of additional veterans treatment courts (VTCs), 
with more than 300 county and state-level VTCs currently operating in 46 states across the 
country. Though the lens through which veterans are viewed may be positive in the public eye, 
institutional support for these wayward veterans appears to vary across levels of government; 
therefore, while some posit the increased social utility of budget-friendly VTCs, others suggest 
that VTCs offer favorable treatment unavailable to nonveterans. In light of these contending 
perspectives, this thesis employs time-series logit models to examine the county-level diffusion 
of VTCs utilizing integrated data ranging from 2004 to 2014. Counties that adopted VTCs were 
more likely to have a local military base, a local VA hospital, greater VA compensation 
expenditures per capita, and lower crime rates; additionally, they were likely to have a higher per 
capita income, a larger minority population, and a smaller veteran population than counties 
without a VTC. This thesis, providing general insight into the innovation and diffusion of 
county-level public policy and veterans policy, supports prior state-level VTC diffusion research 
findings of increased social utility, and contends a top-down trajectory of diminishing wayward 
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 The U.S. Army’s initial study regarding the mental health of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
veterans found that about one in eight solders reported symptoms of post-traumatic stress 
disorder, and that less than half of those experiencing problems sought help (White et al. 2012). 
Anderson and Rees (2015) state that exposure to combat is often described by mental health 
experts as triggering, or indirectly leading to, acts of violent crime on returning home. Therefore, 
given the attribution of combat exposure as an indicator of unchecked mental and/or behavioral 
disorder, the onset of new military campaigns such as Operation Enduring Freedom and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom may foretell increased veteran crime rates. Anchorage, Alaska, hosting 
the highest per capita population of veterans (Murkowski 2011), established the first known VTC 
in 2004 with a mission to reduce the number of criminal cases involving veterans (Smith 2012). 
As of 2009, only one out of 34 veterans completing the Anchorage VTC program between July 
2004 and July 2006 had been rearrested (Ruggeri 2009). Smith (2012) recognizes the spectrum 
of (individual) VTC policies and procedures across the country, and though many of these 
specialized courts follow a latter VTC model proposed by Judge Russell of Erie County, New 
York in 2009, the geographic boundaries of VTCs’ jurisdictions also vary. Today, VTC 
jurisdictions include: municipalities, counties, (regional) judicial circuits, and an entire state.   
 Although Alaska’s was the first VTC, the creation of the VTC in Erie County, New York 
was the first to draw national attention. In the midst of America’s 21st century War on Terrorism, 
the Honorable Robert Russell in Buffalo, New York began to notice a surge in justice-involved 
U.S. military veterans. While presiding over his Drug Court and Mental Health Court dockets, 
Judge Russell found that many post-9/11 combat veterans were facing serious, often service-
connected issues such as: alcohol and substance abuse, mental illness, homelessness, 
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unemployment, and strained personal relationships (Russell 2009). Building upon the tenets of 
problem-solving drug courts, Judge Russell established the nation’s first official VTC in January 
2008 with the assistance of the local veteran affairs medical center and volunteer veterans in the 
community. This innovative concept, in recognition of the unique service and sacrifice borne by 
veterans, unites resources critical to the successful rehabilitation of wayward veterans, including 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) veteran benefits, rehabilitative community-based 
programs, and the inspirational fraternity observed between members of the Unites States armed 
forces. 
 In lieu of their ability to reduce recidivism rates and the costs associated with traditional 
sentencing methods, these specialized problem-solving courts have spread rapidly throughout the 
country. According the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, more than 350 VTCs are in 
operation across the United States (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 2017), with many more 
currently in development. Critics of the veterans treatment court collaborative approach suggest 
that such an exclusive problem-solving program amounts to a “get out of jail free” card for 
veterans; however, VTCs have proven to be rigorous and challenging programs, generating both 
economic and social returns on investment to their respective communities (Russell 2015). Judge 
Russell, addressing concerns raised by these specialized courts, poses the following question to 
proponents and skeptics alike: why create a treatment court specific to veterans, and why not 
work with these individuals within the established drug and mental health treatment courts 
(Russell 2009)? While the concern for potentially favorable treatment embodies a vigilant 
dedication to democratic principles, the proliferation of VTCs appears to be based on the ancient 
principle of nemo resideo: leave no one behind (Button & Schreckhise 2017). 
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 The genealogy of nemo resideo as a precept of military and civic culture dates to the 
Spartans of Greece. According to the Greek biographer Plutarch (1931), Spartan women were 
said to hand deploying husbands and sons their shields, saying “either this or upon this”, 
suggesting the soldier either live by their shield or return home (dead or wounded) on it. A 
Spartan shield was more than a defensive armament, it was a symbol of pride for soldiers, it was 
a necessary component for Spartan battle tactics, and it represented Spartan culture and military 
doctrine; therefore, the shield was a battle implement for the common good of all soldiers, and 
thus for the entire Spartan community (Plutarch 1931). Due in part to the concept of a Spartan 
soldier being returned home on his shield, the cultural promise of no one left behind permeates 
time and space as an enduring tenet of civilization. 
 Contemporary U.S. military culture rigorously adheres to the ancient precedent of nemo 
resideo. The renowned Warrior Ethos is a core U.S. Army value, and is embraced by all 
branches of the armed forces as an inseparable pledge of duty to both country and comrade.   
Nemo resideo is found within a number of military ethos, creeds, and mottos, including: The 
Airman’s Creed, the motto of the Marine Corps’ Personnel Retrieval and Processing Company, 
the Air Force Pararescue Motto, the Coast Guard Rescue Swimmer Motto, and the Navy Air 
Rescue Swimmer Motto. Despite the lack of official policy of “no one left behind” in U.S. 
military doctrine, U.S. military battle readiness and esprit de corps are profoundly influenced by 
this promise forged in military culture. 
 Revered for its doctrinal adherence to nemo resideo, military culture does not hold a 
monopoly over the ancient concept. Several world-renowned service organizations embrace the 
principle in its contemporary civilian adaptation, such as: Human Rights Watch, No One Left 
Behind, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, numerous 
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organizations like the Overseas Development Institute, UNICEF, and the Center for Global 
Development who have pledged to support the U.N.’s Sustainable Development Goals, and 
many more. While it is evident that civilian culture often embraces the principle of nemo resideo 
through service organizations, efforts are not isolated to assisting other civilians. Just as Spartan 
women did, many U.S. civilians engage in service-oriented industries that support military 
veterans, such as the VA.   
 Originally borrowed for the title of a VA report to the Congressional Committee on 
Veterans’ Affairs, “To care for him who shall have borne the battle” was adopted as the VA’s 
motto based on a passage from Abraham Lincoln second inaugural address (U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs 2017). The VA motto embodies the sacred promise to care for U.S. military 
veterans, completing the cycle of nemo resideo between soldiers and an indebted nation. As 
Lincoln explained, to bear the wounds of battle, both physical and mental, is a sacrifice worthy 
of not being left behind; therefore, the VTC concept is not designed to treat an exclusive faction 
of stakeholders better than others, but rather to fulfill a contemporary promise to those who have 
sacrificed so much. 
 Nemo resideo is evident in modern American culture, and while the promise to return 
soldiers home has endured and evolved (e.g. through new technologies), so too has the return on 
investment to their communities. Today’s American polity continues to trend towards an 
increased penchant for streamlined program budgeting that preserves existing public services and 
entitlements with increased efficiency, a trend relevant at the national, state, and local-levels 
(McKean 1958; Wildavsky 1966; Bohn 1995; Bischoff & Blaeschke 2016). To achieve such 
goals, government institutions have adopted policy and program innovations projected to 
enhance fiscal efficiency. Often looking to innovation leaders for existing program models, 
5 
 
governments incorporate cost-benefit analyses when considering the cost-savings power of 
adoption. Therefore, the reciprocating returns on investment for civilian stakeholders (i.e. 
taxpayers) can be observed in the adoption of VTCs that promise increased cost-savings, 
increased public safety, and decreased rates of recidivism in exchange for the promise of leaving 
no soldier behind, even after soldiers reintegrate post-service. 
 This thesis examines the development of these VTCs across the country. It begins by briefly 
discussing the history of veterans’ compensation benefits, the development of problem-solving 
courts, leading federal court rulings on veterans’ benefits, and how each of these policy 
environments have converged to promote the proliferation of VTCs. Drawing from the literature 
on diffusion theory, its applicability to the antecedent drug court innovation, and the adoption of 
Judge Russell’s veteran-specific treatment court innovation to rehabilitate local wayward 
veterans, the thesis then develops models that explain why some counties have developed VTCs 










A Genealogy of Veterans Treatment Courts 
 With origins dating back to ancient Greece, military and civic culture has honored the 
sacrifices of military servicemembers with the solemn promise of nemo resideo, and the 
combined promise from both cultures is evident in the VTC concept. Numerous communities in 
the U.S. have created and sustained these specialized courts, and many veterans have made the 
commitment to serve within VTC programs in a variety of roles (sometimes pro bono), such as: 
judges, counselors, veterans justice outreach specialists, mentors, and others. Spanning the 
origins of nemo resideo and the modern paradigm of VTCs is a rich history of culture embracing 
the care of military servicemembers; however, the focus herein will be the American cultural 
influence on the VTC concept. 
A Brief History of Veterans Compensation Benefits 
 Though President Lincoln may have inspired the VA’s motto, the American promise to its 
servicemembers dates as far back as the Revolutionary War. Revolutionary War soldiers serving 
through to the end were granted pensions, public land grants, and (severe) disability pay by the 
Continental Congress; however, only about 3,000 were able to receive a pension (U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs 2017). The intent of such benefits was to encourage enlistment, 
prevent desertions, and to further compensate maimed and severely disabled soldiers. The 
ratification of the U.S. Constitution brought about significant change for the bureaucratic 
management of veterans’ compensation, placing the fiscal and administrative responsibilities on 
the Department of War’s Bureau of Pensions. After its reassignment to the Department of the 
Interior, the Bureau of Pensions faced the unprecedented challenge brought about by a protracted 
Civil War. While new innovations in veteran benefits had already been approved prior to the 
7 
 
war, the scale and severity of the Civil War brought about a series of additional innovations in 
veterans’ compensation benefits.   
 At the conclusion of the Civil War, the country had over 20 times the number of veterans it 
had prior to the war’s advent. Furthermore, these figures do not account for Confederate veterans 
who were not awarded federal benefits until 1958. Recognizing the immediate need for veterans’ 
compensation, Congress passed The General Pension Act of 1862 that extended both the quality 
of compensation benefits based on degree of disability and rank, and the range of benefactors 
that were eligible to receive federal compensation (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 2017). 
Following several years of continued growth, development, and realignment, the Bureau of 
Pensions received additional support through the Dependent Pension Act of 1890, which 
provided significant expansion of veterans’ compensation benefits by broadening the scope of 
eligibility. Subsequently, the number of veterans enrolled in federal pensions doubled to nearly 
one million (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 2017).   
 Taking veterans compensation into the twentieth century, the Sherwood Act of 1912 
reflected an era of progressive social reform in its expansion of pensions to all military veterans, 
regardless of being sick or disabled. Within that same decade, a series of new laws produced a 
number of benefit-expanding services, to include The War Risk Insurance Act of 1914 to insure 
veterans against loss of life, personal injury or capture by the enemy while on board American 
merchant ships, a 1917 amendment providing government subsidized life insurance, 
rehabilitation and vocational training for veterans with disabilities, and the eventual provision for 
vocational education to all honorably discharged veterans (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 
2017). The United States’ decision to enter into World War I played an integral role in the 
continued advancement and expansion of veteran compensation benefits. Such progress 
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continued in the interwar period, with the consolidation of veteran programs into three agencies 
and a period of legal reform initiated by Bureau of Pensions director Frank Hines, producing a 
62% increase in compensation and pension expenditures (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 
2017).   
 Prior to the onset of WWII, the recently-formed Veterans’ Bureau experienced backlash 
from veterans who believed that their government was defaulting on its sacred promise. A direct 
result of the hard times faced during the Great Depression, the federal government began issuing 
promissory certificates to be paid out many years into the future, rather than making immediate 
payments. After thousands of veterans descended on Washington D.C. to protest the policies of 
the newly formed Veterans Administration, Congress began working on and eventually passing 
the GI Bill of Rights. Despite these difficult times, the passage of the GI Bill of Rights ensured 
that the 16 million veterans returning from WWII would receive a comprehensive benefits 
package for their dedication to service expenditures (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 2017).   
 A number of new laws were passed in the post-WWII era, generating compensation benefits 
programs that would greatly improve the comprehensiveness of VA services. The Veterans’ 
Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952 added new employment and education benefits; 
furthermore, it added new policies that placed benefit-specific restrictions on eligibility, 
effectively streamlining the allocation of veterans’ benefits (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 
2017). Such streamlining policies became the precedent for future legislation and bureaucratic 
policymaking, whereby payments of benefits would be measured on a sliding scale according to 
the individual veteran’s determined degree of need. Following the Vietnam War, several special 
eligibility programs were developed to provide ever-more inclusive compensation benefits to 
veterans in need. As battlefield wounds become increasingly more survivable, and as society 
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continues to progress through social and technological advancements, the responsibility of 
delivering a nation’s commitment to veterans has demanded the pursuit of more expansive, more 
specialized, and more efficient compensation benefits programs; however, to achieve such goals, 
the judicial branch has joined with the legislative and executive branches to ensure a promise 
kept. 
A Brief History of Problem-solving Courts  
 As predecessors to VTCs, drug courts offer a bridge between criminal justice reform and the 
provision of health services for justice-involved drug addicts, forging an alternative path away 
from mass incarceration. In return for its investment into these non-violent drug offenders, 
community stakeholders investing in such diversionary programs expect to realize such benefits 
as: lower rates of recidivism, increased public safety, reduced prison system operating costs, and 
a greater contribution to society from drug court participants (Eaglin 2016). As Lessenger and 
Roper (2007) elucidate, judges find it undesirable for repeat drug offenders to serve out their 
period of incarceration (often to an adverse and unstable environment) and soon find themselves 
once again in legal turmoil. The social utility of this downward spiral lacks in effectiveness and 
efficiency; however, while the feasibility of the drug court paradigm appears to support adoption, 
some trade-offs may be expected. 
 Eaglin (2016) suggests three distinct deficiencies of the drug court paradigm that may 
aggravate defects in the criminal justice system, and Lessenger and Roper contribute a set of 
roadblocks as well. First, Eaglin (2016) notes that drug court eligibility requirements are limiting 
to the degree that most offenders are excluded from participation, and thus from the opportunity 
to realize the benefits of diversionary programs. Eaglin’s second observation is that, for the 
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remaining offenders not eligible for drug court, the reality of increased sentence lengths due to 
criminal justice reforms often takes a backseat to the narrative touting drug court successes. 
Eaglin’s third observation suggests that the drug court paradigm allows the state a greater scope 
of incursion and control into the private lives of citizens through the justice system, voluntary or 
not (Eaglin 2016). Finally, Lessenger and Roper (2007) weigh in, suggesting a set of institutional 
roadblocks, including: a loss of local autonomy from the acceptance of federal funds, the added 
responsibility placed on judges to act as social workers, the increased lethargy of the criminal 
justice system due to an increased case load, resistance from public servants to accept criminal 
justice innovations, and public perceptions of risk associated with drug addiction, the robust 
program requirements, and fairness. Despite such concerns, drug courts have generally been 
successful since their inception. 
 In 1989, Miami-Dade County opened the first drug court in an attempt to end the costly 
cycle of recidivism among drug offenders, and since then hundreds of new drug courts have 
emulated Miami-Dade’s model, each utilizing their own court-level policies and techniques. 
Generally, all drug courts utilize the same method: identify addicted offenders, assess offenders 
for candidacy, refer qualifying drug offenders to treatment programs, maintain close supervision 
(including routine drug testing) through the process, and punish or reward program participants 
based on their performance (Lessenger & Roper 2007). In addition to these operational methods, 
drug courts are founded on seven principles: 1) retaining the participant in treatment through the 
pain of withdrawal; 2) helping the participant overcome fear, cravings, and shame; 3) providing 
modulated and immediate sanctions; 4) discerning between behavior and addition symptoms; 5) 
providing a system of rewards; 6) Understanding that whether an act constitutes a punishment or 
a reward depends on the perception of the recipient; 7) Dismissing charges as a reward 
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(Lessenger & Roper 2007). Due to the challenges participants face throughout the process, 
judges and program administrators often rely on coercion to encourage retention to increase the 
likelihood of successful program completion and recovery.   
 After twelve years of drug court innovation and adoption, the Department of Justice initiated 
a set of federal sentencing reforms designed to quantify the economic and logistical status quo, 
reduce prison populations, and to provide cost-saving policy alternatives. This Justice 
Reinvestment Initiative (JRI), instituted a series of strategic reforms over the following decade, 
aided by the 2010 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act that provided additional support 
and funding from Congress (Eaglin 2016). Eaglin (2016) further explains that, while each state 
receives its own customized assessment of the dynamics driving its prison population growth, 
JRI generally extends a number of standard recommendations, including: the adoption of 
evidence-base policies and practices, the use of risk and needs assessments, problem-solving 
courts, graduated sanctions, and program monitoring to measure effectiveness. As a result of its 
strategic reforms, JRI successfully contributed to reduced rates of prison population growth in 
over half of all U.S. states through 2014; additionally, JRI has diffused down to state-level 
governments, with eighteen states implementing their own JRI-style legislation at the time of 
Eaglin’s article. In summary, JRI has further demonstrated the effectiveness of the drug court 
model through strategic reforms targeting returns on investment such as recidivism and program 
expenditures. 
 Despite drug court innovations and the ensuing reform efforts, social and political concerns 
within the problem-solving court system remained. At a time when politicians were ramping up 
their narrative of a tougher stance on crime, federal, state, and local government institutions 
continued to adopt and implement reform-based drug courts and other problem-solving criminal 
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justice programs (Eaglin 2016; Tiger 2011). While the political rhetoric in Washington D.C. 
raged, local communities drove the criminal justice reforms that shifted focus to the individual 
offender, encouraging accountability, performance-based rewards, and new perspectives on what 
constitutes a successful outcome for both the offender and the local community. Eaglin (2016) 
illuminates the evolving political discourse on criminal justice reform, once focused on a 
position of being “tough on crime” and shifting towards policies that capitalize on the utility of 
being “smart on crime.” While drug courts have demonstrated an ability to reduce recidivism, 
reduce criminal justice expenditures, and provide improved outcomes for offenders and their 
communities, the problem-solving court paradigm would soon adopt specialized VTCs in the 
wake of Supreme Court rulings expanding the legal rights of veterans.  
A History of Supreme Court Rulings on Veterans Benefits 
 In response to the diffusion of the drug court innovative, efforts to expand individual legal 
rights and the degree to which a person may exercise their proposed rights within this new legal 
frontier found renewed salience. At the same time, veterans were fighting for the expansion of 
their own service-connected benefits, and as is often the case, such efforts experienced 
institutional pushback (Ridgeway 2012). Despite this pushback, a number of cases challenging 
the limitations of existing and newly implemented veterans’ benefits programs found their way 
to the Supreme Court (Gugliuzza 2011). Among these cases are a select few that answered 
pivotal questions regarding Constitutional rights within an emerging focus of the criminal justice 




 Opening the door for a new era of veterans’ law within the federal circuit, the Judicial 
Review Act of 1988 put an end to the VA’s entitlement to benefits decision-making process. 
Allen (2011) referred to as an era of “splendid isolation”. Prior to the Judicial Review Act, the 
U.S. Veterans Administration held the predominance of power over determinations regarding 
veterans’ benefit claims; however, the new law created the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans 
Claims (CAVC), extending the precedent of judicial review established by Marbury v. Madison 
(1803)1 (Allen 2011). Prior to the Judicial Review Act, the Supreme Court decision handed down 
from Mathews v. Eldridge (1976)2 was hailed as the “most important contemporary doctrinal 
development in procedural due process”, as it ruled government actions (e.g. the termination of 
social security benefits) would not require a prior hearing on the bases of the utility of the 
hearing relative to its cost (Serota & Singer 2011). As a result, the Mathews balancing test was 
created, which measures the adequacy of a procedure according to the impact on a claimant, the 
government, and the public. More specifically, to determine if a certain procedure complies with 
the Due Process Clause, a judge must take into account each of the following factors: the private 
interest affected by government action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such private 
interest, and the government’s interest as it pertains to fiscal and administrative burdens (Serota 
& Singer 2011). 
 Having established the constitutional legality of due process and judicial review within 
veterans’ law, the stage was then set for a new era of jurisprudence reining in the regulations 
governing veterans’ benefits rights. In some instances, the Supreme Court would rule in favor of 
veterans by expanding their rights, and sometimes it would rule in favor of the Government’s 
                                                          
1 5 U.S. 137 (1803) 
2 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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interests by limiting the scope of veterans’ rights. First, Shinseki v. Sanders (2009)3 relaxed the 
burden on the VA in determinations of error that might be ruled as prejudicial, thus reversing the 
appeal in favor of the veteran. The decision emphasized a “case-specific application of 
judgement”; subsequently, the United States Supreme Court in the case Henderson v. Shinseki 
(2011)4 reversed a U.S. Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit Court ruling that a statutory 120-
day deadline for filing a notice of appeal to the VTC was a jurisdictional deadline (Gugliuzza 
2011). In an opinion presented by Justice Alito, The Court determined that Congress did not 
intend jurisdictional consequences regarding an appeal deadline, citing the pro-veteran, informal, 
and non-adversarial nature of the veterans’ benefits system (Gugliuzza 2011). Gugliuzza, citing 
the recentness of these cases, speculated that The Supreme Court may be taking an increased 
interest in veterans’ law, and that the increased veterans’ demands placed on the benefits system 
may warrant the added interest. 
 Further extending the rights of veterans who apply for benefits, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit in Cushman v. Shinseki (2009)5 ruled that applicants for VA benefits had 
a constitutionally protected property interest, which entitled applicants to procedural protections 
under the Fifth Amendment. This decision was reached based on the interpretation that veteran 
entitlement benefits are “nondiscretionary”, and “statutorily mandated”; subsequently, the nature 
of the ruling was pivotal to the protection of the Due Process Clause (Allen 2011). Finally, after 
a sequence of victories for the protection of veteran benefit claims, Gambill v. Shinseki (2009)6 
addressed the question of a veteran’s available due process resources when challenging the 
written medical opinions of the VA Medical Board. The decision limited federal court 
                                                          
3 556 U.S. 396 (2009) 
4 562 U.S. 428 (2011) 
5 576 F.3d 1290 (2009) 
6 576 F.3d 1307 (2009) 
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jurisdiction to constitutional issues, suggesting that “the most effective way of countering a 
questionable opinion is to offer a contrary opinion with more support in the medical literature of 
from other medical experts” (Gambill v. Shinseki 2009). Since Gambill, The Federal Circuit has 
reaffirmed the constitutional limitations in both the Wanless v. Shineski (2010)7 decision and the 
D’Auria v. McDonald (2015) dismissed appeal, noting the Federal Courts’ lack of jurisdiction to 
“review a challenge to (A) a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as 
applied to the facts of a particular case (Wanless v. Shineski 2010). 
 These cases, in their determinations of the extent to which due process applies to veteran 
benefits claims, profoundly impact veteran access to VTC programs that often determine 
program eligibility according to VA compensation and benefits eligibility. Finally, the pivotal 
Supreme Court case of Porter v. McCollum (2009)8 supplied what might be labeled at the 
keystone for the proliferation of VTCs.  As Jones (2013) explains, the per curium decision of the 
Supreme Court elevated the significance of combat exposure to sentencing determinations in 
death penalty cases, requiring the inclusion of military service records as evidence for 
consideration. The consideration of military service, when deciding on a departure from 
sentencing guidelines, is designed to incorporate a more complete profile of offender 
characteristics and any unusual degree of deviation from typical cases encompassed by the 
sentencing guidelines (Jones 2013). By choosing not to produce such evidence, according to the 
Supreme Court, the defense attorney would be deemed to have violated the client’s 6th 
Amendment right to effective legal counsel. Therefore, Porter v. McCollum laid the groundwork 
for the expansion of military service record evidence into criminal cases other than those 
involving a potential death sentence for the defendant.   
                                                          
7 618 F.3d 1333 (2010) 
8 558 U.S. 30 (2009) 
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Making the Connection: The Veterans Treatment Court Concept  
 The veterans treatment courts concept was created from the combination of government 
actions expanding, regulating, and modernizing veteran benefit programs through contemporary 
interpretations of Constitutional law, and the work of public policy entrepreneurs such as Judge 
Russell. In his 2009 article “Veterans Treatment Court: A Proactive Approach”, Judge Russell 
provides the blueprint for his pioneering problem-solving court model. Reinforced by the rise of 
post-9/11 veteran populations and their coinciding increase in criminal justice system 
involvement, Russell (2009) echoes the timeless burden of those who have borne the battle, 
citing a litany of issues and problems facing modern-day veterans, including: substance abuse, 
homelessness, strained relationships, unemployment, and (general) mental health. These issues 
and problems, which can vary greatly based upon individual circumstance, are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive of one another. Furthermore, it could be argued that, if left untreated due to 
barriers such as pride, stigmatization, or socioeconomic status, problems experienced by veterans 
may likely be compounded. 
 To support his framework of the most commonly reported veteran issues and problems, 
Russell laments the burgeoning trend of justice-involved veterans, both through his own 
observations as a judge and through national crime statistics. Therefore, with the alarming 
growth of justice-involved veterans defined, and the most likely determinants enumerated, 
Russell presents the question of “Why a Veterans Treatment Court?” His answer: specialized 
drug and mental health treatment courts already exist, so why not implement a program of 
tailored justice and care for a unique segment of the population that may not respond favorably 
to traditional (and costly) community service (Russell 2009)? Having set the stage for problem-
solving courts designed to leverage modernized veterans’ rights to benefit services, Russell sets 
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forth the 10 key components of the VTC model. These ten key components are a modification of 
the essential tenets of the 10 key components described in the U.S. Department of Justice 
publication entitled Defining Drug Courts: The Key Components (Russell 2009).  Table 1 
enumerates these 10 key components.  
 Table 1  
10 Key Components of the Veterans Treatment Court Model 
Key Component #1 
Veterans Treatment Court integrates alcohol, drug treatment, and 
mental health services with justice system case processing 
Key Component #2 
Using a non-adversarial approach, prosecution and defense counsel 
promote public safety while protecting participants' due process 
rights 
Key Component #3 
Eligible participants are identified early and promptly placed in the 
Veterans Treatment Court program 
Key Component #4 
The Veterans Treatment Court provides access to a continuum of 
alcohol, drug, mental health and other related treatment and 
rehabilitation services 
Key Component #5 Abstinence is monitored by frequent alcohol and other drug testing 
Key Component #6 
A coordinated strategy governs Veterans Treatment Court responses 
to participants' compliance 
Key Component #7 Ongoing judicial interaction with each veteran is essential 
Key Component #8 
Monitoring and evaluation measures the achievement of program 
goals and gauges effectiveness 
Key Component #9 
Continuing interdisciplinary education promotes effective Veterans 
Treatment Court planning, implementation, and operation 
Key Component #10 
Forging partnerships among the Veterans Treatment Court, the VA, 
public agencies, and community-based organizations generates local 
support and enhances the Veterans Treatment Court's effectiveness 
  
As stated within the key components of its model, the VTC model is an evolution in the 
drug court paradigm, facilitated by the expansion of veterans’ benefit services and Constitutional 
rights addressing the modernization of veterans’ law. However, while VTCs have proliferated 
since Judge Russell’s Buffalo court, the VTC concept demonstrates the capacity to capitalize on 
available opportunities for increased inclusivity and diversification of services. As Cartwright 
(2011) explains, there is an opportunity to expand the capacity for judges in jurisdictions outside 
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of the existing VTC network to consider a defendant’s military service and subsequent 
placement into problem-solving treatment programs. While a number of other opportunities 
exist, the evolution of the VTC concept is reliant upon the ardent pursuit of program goals by its 
many stakeholders, to ensure the healthy and safe reintegration of military veterans into their 
communities through a proactive problem-solving approach that benefits veterans, their 
















Literature Review  
 Fulfilling such a promise to U.S. veterans requires both legal and cultural paradigms 
spanning multiple policy arenas within a federated system of government. Veteran treatment 
court innovation has been adopted through multiple streams such as: a local court’s creation of a 
new docket, state-level legislation, a commission of local and/or state policy elites, and through 
partnerships with key stakeholder such as the VA. Presently, 46 states have at least one VTC in 
operation, with more than 350 courts in operation nationwide and no known cases in which an 
existing VTC has suspended operations. These figures provide a substantial pool of host states 
and localities when considering the determinants of adoption across time. An exploration of prior 
research, often analyzing the economic and social utility of VTCs (and other alternative courts) 
via cost-benefit analyses, will lend perspective to the selection of independent variables 
employed in this study. Therefore, building on prior research examining the political, economic, 
and social determinants of VTC successes through individual case studies or regional effects, this 
study of VTC diffusion utilizes a near-nationwide dataset of county-level variables.   
Diffusion of Innovation  
 Walker (1969) defines innovation as a program or policy which is new to the government 
adopting it. Though Walker’s article addresses innovation in the context of states, the definition 
is applicable at the county level. Berry and Berry (2014) refer generically to government entities 
as jurisdictions. Given the phenomenon of innovation, Berry and Berry (1990) ask “what causes 
government to adopt a new program or policy?” Berry and Berry posit two answers to this 
question. First, a model of internal determinants argues that factors leading a jurisdiction to 
innovate are political, economic, and social characteristics internal to that jurisdiction (Berry & 
20 
 
Berry 1990). Second, regional diffusion argues that a jurisdiction emulates its neighbors when 
confronted with policy problems (Berry & Berry 1990), which may occur through mechanisms 
such as: learning, imitation, normative pressure, competition, and coercion (Berry & Berry 
2014). Though a jurisdictional condition has the potential applicability as both an internal 
determinant and regional diffusion effect, Berry and Berry note that prior research has often held 
these two explanations separate, even when both are included in research.  
 Existing diffusion of innovation literature posits the influence of regional diffusion on the 
adoption of innovation (i.e. veterans treatment courts), including: the diffusion of other public 
policy innovations (Gray 1973; Savage 1978; Mooney 2001), federal government involvement 
(Welch and Thompson 1980; Allen et al. 2004; Karch 2006), influence from interest groups 
(Allen 2005; Garrett and Jansa 2015), and judicial intervention (Canon and Baum 1981; Shah 
2014). In contrast, internal determinants of VTC diffusion may include such measures as the 
jurisdiction’s veteran population per capita, measures of partisanship (i.e. election results), the 
presence of public or private facilities, or others. Furthermore, research has explored the 
diffusion of innovations at the local-level (Crain 1966; Bingham 1977; Walker et al. 2011), with 
studies of drug court diffusion focusing on topics such as civil rights law (Johnson 2016) and 
strategies to combat methamphetamine usage within high-risk localities (Huddleston 2005). 
Diffusion analyses by Berry and Berry (1990) and Mintrom (1997) have utilizes a proportional 
measure of boundaries within their models, applicable to county-level diffusion research.  
Alternative Courts: The Antecedent Innovation 
 At their core, VTCs are a type of alternative court, evidenced by Judge Russell’s 10 key 
VTC components that were derived from existing drug court models. Generally, alternative 
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courts aim to rehabilitate qualifying offenders, diverting them from traditional, cost-prohibitive 
correction measures such as incarceration (National Drug Court Institute 1999; Nolan 2002; 
Lessenger & Roper 2007). As well, alternative courts have demonstrated the capacity to generate 
a greater net social benefit through second chance opportunities for offenders at a reduced cost to 
stakeholders such as the respective communities, taxpayers, and the state. Due to its successes, 
interest in the diffusion of drug court innovations has arisen to help identify the political, 
economic, and social determinants of adoption (Terry 1999; Douglas et al. 2015). Holding as a 
salient topic in political discourse, alternative courts have remained a staple of the American 
judicial institution since Miami pioneered the first drug court in 1989 (Tauber and Huddleston 
1999, Wenzel et al. 2001, Eaglin 2016). Research such as that of Terry, Douglas et al., and Nolan 
has examined the qualitative influence of socioeconomic determinants of alternative court 
adoption via case studies. However, the availability of county-level data quantifying institutional 
criminal justice attributes such as prison capacity rates and local crime rates supports additional 
opportunities for study, including time-series analysis. 
 Existing literature on alternative courts is expansive. Research has outlined the framework 
and strategies behind the establishment of successful treatment courts (Fulkerson et al. 2013), 
estimated the returns on investment for communities linked to alternative court outcomes (Logan 
et al. 2004; Burrus et al. 2011), and analyzed measures of recidivism, effectiveness, and quality 
within the drug court model (Goldkamp et al. 2001; Koetzle-Shaffer 2011). Additional strategies, 
beyond the implementation stages of adoption, posit budgetary and political strategies for 
sustainable court operations (Douglas & Hartley 2004). Rounding out the drug court literature, 
research has utilized predictive analyses to posit successful graduation rates of these problem-
solving courts (Gill 2016; Mattson et al. 2012; Schiff & Terry 1997), and estimated the overall fit 
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of alternate treatment courts in the American criminal justice system and their respective 
communities (Nolan 2002). Burrus et al., in their analyses of program costs, avoided costs, and 
post-treatment economic and behavioral benefits for program graduates, demonstrate the 
viability of a county’s economic position when considering VTC adoption. These considerations 
are aided by a veteran’s eligibility for VA benefit services, as well as the proximity of VA 
hospitals capable of providing such services. 
Veterans in Society 
 Making the connection between alternative courts and VTCs first requires an exploration of 
literature regarding the treatment of U.S. military veterans. Veteran policy, most notably the 
treatment of veterans, has seen a significant increase in its salience within American political 
discourse due to the recent VA wait-time crisis (Kizer & Jha 2014). Perceptions of veterans are 
essential to the adoption of effective policy innovations, and their diffusion. These perceptions 
originate from veterans themselves (Hepner et al. 2014), and from the civilian populace (Sayer et 
al. 2011; Osborne 2014; Adler et al. 2015; Schreger and Kimle 2016). Subsequently, 
comparisons of veteran and civilian perceptions (Teclaw et al. 2016) have joined the discussion. 
These perceptions, formed in part by the social construction (Schneider & Ingram, 1993) of 
veterans, have historically afforded the group a number of compensation benefits, embodying the 
fundamental principle of nemo resideo. Such compensation and benefits (depending on 
eligibility) are exemplified by The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, also known as the 
G.I. Bill (Simon et al. 2010; Patterson 2011). Generally, veteran status as a social construction 
equates to a high-powered, positively advantaged classification. Since VTCs are designed as 
problem-solving courts for wayward veterans, measures of local political support, such as 
elections, may be indicative of varied perceptions within the populace.  
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 Dating back to the provision of pensions and land for Revolutionary War veterans 
(Department of Veterans Affairs 2017), compensation benefits for qualifying veterans have 
evolved (Fox Jr. 2004; Mall 2013) to include service-connected disabilities (Sayer et al. 2004; 
Hynes et al. 2007; Singleton 2009, Maynard et al. 2010; Belsher et al. 2012). The addition of due 
process (Riley 2010; Allen 2011; Serota and Singer 2011), via the United States Court of 
Appeals for Veterans Claims, ensures that veterans are provided the full measure of disability 
benefits they have earned. Finally, fair and impartial justice for veterans (and taxpayers in kind) 
is embodied in the application of judicial review (Eaton et al. 2010; Gugliuzza 2011; Ridgeway 
2013; Moshiashwilli 2015) to veteran-specific legal matters. Measuring county-level VA 
compensation and pension expenditures is supported by the expansion of veterans’ compensation 
and benefits rights through the federal court system, typically granting eligible veteran offenders 
access VTC services. 
Veterans Treatment Courts: Putting it All Together 
 If the tenets of the VTC mission include nemo resideo and a correlating return on 
investment for state budgets, a comprehensive framework of judicial intervention is essential to 
addressing the many (and complex) issues faced by justice-involved veterans. With a chronicle 
of precedents dating back to Judge Russell’s innovative court, literature recounting the 
foundations of VTCs (Wall 2014; Russell 2015; Frederick 2014) exemplifies the crucible in 
which continuing research and development is forged (Button & Schreckhise 2017). Similar to 
veterans seeking compensation benefits, justice-involved veterans have their own needs, both in 
navigating the criminal justice system, and in mitigating the service-connected conditions that 
may have led them there.  As observed by Judge Russell, conditions such as trauma (Walls 2010; 
Cavenaught 2010; McCormick-Goodhart 2012; Slattery et al. 2013; Knudsen and Wingenfeld 
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2016), have (in part) been linked to increasing trends of justice-involved veterans. Localities 
with proportionally higher veteran populations may find greater utility in early adoption of the 
VTCs problem-solving approach.    
 Just as drug courts have done for civilians, VTCs have sought out alternative treatment 
methods to mitigate the increased trend in justice-involve veterans (Smee et al. 2013; Smelson et 
al. 2015; Albertson et al. 2015). County-level success of VTCs (Gales 2012) highlight the 
efficacy of well-executed methods, which may garner increased attention from local 
policymakers, and for continued proliferation nationwide (Russell 2009; Cartwright 2011; 
Baldwin 2014). In lieu of the given social construction of veterans, advocacy both for and 
against specialized treatment courts for justice-involved veterans can be expected (Button & 
Schreckhise 2017). However, the Supreme Court specifically addressed concerns of favorable 
sentencing for veterans in Porter v. McCollum (2009). The Porter decision holds that presenting 
a veteran’s military service record in court, as mitigating evidence applied to the sentencing 
phase, is a requirement of adequate representation within the domain of due process set forth in 
the 14th Amendment. Salient to the VTC process, the precedent established in Porter relegates 
advocacy against VTCs to either the degree in which they are advocated for, or to a general 
disagreement with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 6th (right to effective counsel) and 
14th Amendments (Jones 2013; Lee 2013).   
 While much is known about VTCs, the proliferation, relative success, and ongoing 
evolution of VTCs provides opportunities for further study, including this study’s quantitative 
approach to potential determinants of the diffusion of the VTC innovation. As new VTC dockets 
are adopted, continued study of these courts’ economic and social returns on investment, in 
addition to local political considerations, could provide more robust evidence of conditions 
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significantly contributing to the assessment of net social benefits. Therefore, advancing the 
knowledge of determinants significant to the diffusion of VTCs at the county level may aid in 
illuminating the social utility of communities in which these specialized courts reside. This study 
seeks to further illuminate the county-level political, social, and economic conditions favorable 
to the adoption of new VTCs. This new approach, applying statistical analysis methodology to a 
near-nationwide dataset of county-level variables, offers a uniquely expansive examination of the 














Data and Variables 
Data  
 The unit of analysis for this study is the individual county for a given calendar year for each 
year from 2004 to 2014. The District of Columbia, U.S. territories, and all 41 independent cities 
are not included within this study. Data for each county-year were collected from all 50 states; 
however, as it pertains to this research, a number of considerations should be noted. First, while 
some states publish and maintain comprehensive lists of active VTCs and their respective start-
years, not all states do; therefore, the dataset for this research may include partial data for some 
states. Secondly, a handful of islands throughout the U.S. are counties unto themselves, which 
may impact the determinants of diffusion in ways not found among counties sharing physical 
borders. Furthermore, the geographic isolation of Hawaii and Alaska removed these two states 
from the analysis. Third, because time-series analyses do not incorporate missing data, a multiple 
imputation technique via Amelia’s bootstrapping-based algorithms was utilized. This technique 
“fills in data in such a way as to not change any relationships in the data but which enables the 
inclusion of all the observed data in the partially missing rows” (Honaker et al. 2017). This 
technique allowing for a strongly balanced dataset when conducting time-series logit regression, 
and avoids the use of listwise deletion methods common to analytic software. Fourth, the unique 
characteristics of Virginia and Alaska’s county equivalents removed Virginia from the analysis 
and further supports Alaska’s removal. Finally, three individual counties were excluded from 
consideration due to inconsistencies among the utilized datasets9. The total N for Model 1 equals 
32,670 county-years (2,970 counties per year). For comparison, Model 2 incorporates Virginia 
and has a total N of 33,715 county-years (3,065 counties per year). 
                                                          




 A dichotomous dependent variable was utilized in which counties not falling within the 
jurisdiction of an operating VTC were assigned a value of “0”. For every county falling under 
the jurisdiction of a qualifying VTC, a value of “1” was assigned beginning with year in which 
that VTC began operations and remaining at “1” for each successive year the court was 
operational. This binary dependent variable is ideal for logistic regression, which hypothesizes 
that the logit (the natural log of the odds of success) is linearly related to the predictors 
(Chatterjee & Simonoff 2013). The logistic regression model parameters provide the basis for 
clinically meaningful estimates of effect, to include a dependent variable not normally 
distributed (Hosmer et al. 2013). Parameters are estimated using maximum log-likelihood, which 
implies that the resultant estimated probabilities of success are the maximum likelihood 
estimates of the conditional probabilities of success given the observed values of the predictors 
(Simonoff 2017). For this study, the event of interest is adoption of the VTC innovation by a 
given county. Data for the dependent variable were derived by the author from several sources, 
as there is no (known) existing repository that comprehensively maintains this information. 
Figure 1 displays a histogram of the dependent variable by year of county VTC adoption, 
ranging from 2008 to 2014. 
 Previous data collection initiatives, such as the American University (2016) study, have 
been conducted by the VA and other organizations to compile information regarding each VTCs’ 
year of commencement. Those studies have produced significant breakthroughs in the 
consolidation of data regarding the characteristics of scores of VTCs; however, these data 
supplemented this thesis’s primary data collection method. State and local court coordinators 
were the primary source of data collection for this thesis. These court coordinators perform a 
28 
 
number of critical functions in support of their courts, and graciously provided the requested data 
so vital to this research. Communication with the court coordinators was primarily conducted via 
direct email and telephone. In some cases, communication was achieved through the court’s 
website, via an online email-based form submission to the assigned account manager (i.e. Utah 
and Arizona). The format in which the requested data were delivered include: Excel 
spreadsheets, Microsoft Word documents, portable document files (PDFs), and direct responses 
to the email inquiry. An additional method of data collection included an online search of 
documents and articles from government and reputable publishers, which were utilized so long 
as the document provided specific reference to the county/counties in which the court served and 
the year in which it began operations. Mention of a specific court circuit, VTC region, or 
otherwise was not deemed to be sufficient information, as these territories may be malleable 
across time.   
Figure 1 




As mentioned, VTC jurisdictions vary greatly, operating at all levels of government and 
embodying the core U.S. principle of federalism. Table 2 displays the composition of VTC 
jurisdictions at the time of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (2017) Veterans Court Inventory 
2014 Fact Sheet Update. These regional and statewide jurisdictions are typically drawn along 
county lines. As such, once a county, regional, or statewide VTC was found to have commenced 
operations in a given year, all counties falling within the jurisdictional territory of that VTC were 
assigned a value of “1” for this research. 
Table 2 
Proportion of VTC Jurisdictions 
Court Jurisdiction (N = 349)  
County  54.2%  
City  8.3%  
Mixed city/county  23.2%  
Regional  8.6%  
Statewide  4.3%  
Federal  1.4%  
  
 The selection and operationalization of the dependent variable serves a set of functions.  
First, a binary dependent variable is appropriate for the estimation of logit models. Secondly, it 
accounts for the various jurisdictions and levels of government in which VTCs operate. Lastly, 
the authorization and implementation of a new VTC is dependent upon state and local polities, 
with the state legislature, the governor, existing courts, criminal justice commissions and/or 
committees, and others all as potential stakeholders. Just as the composition of authorizing 
collaborations vary, so too does the documentation that chronicles the authorization and 
implementation of a new VTC. Examples include the state of Illinois’ Veterans and 
Servicemembers Court Treatment Act that authorized VTCs before any VTCs began operations, 
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and North Carolina’s Governors Crime Commission tasked with investigating, planning, and 
implementing the VTC innovation. Regardless of its pedigree, the year in which a court began 
operations was recorded for each county it reported to serve. 
Independent Variables 
 Employed in this study’s analyses are a number of political, economic, and social variables. 
First, the Border_VTC variable was constructed utilizing a regional diffusion model (F. Berry & 
W. Berry 1990; Mintrom 1997) that measures the proportion of border counties falling under the 
jurisdiction of an operating VTC. For a given calendar year, the number of qualifying border 
counties was divided by the total number of border counties, generating a value ranging between 
0 and 1. This variable was generated using data collected for the dependent variable and county-
level maps of the U.S. and individual states. Bordering counties located in a state other than that 
of the subject county were not included in this ratio. 
 The first political variable employed consists of county-level election results for U.S. House 
of Representatives elections. This election data was chosen primarily for its 2-year nationwide 
availability, arguably the most consistent and frequently occurring data of its kind. The 
County_HOR variable is measured by subtracting the Democratic candidate’s total votes from 
the Republican candidate’s total votes; therefore, this measure will produce a positive result 
when the Republican candidate’s total votes equal 50% plus one or greater, and it will produce a 
negative result when the Democratic candidate’s total votes is equal to or greater than 50% plus 
one. These data were derived from datasets made available through Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. 
Presidential Elections (Leip 2017), whose data has been utilized by a number of reputable media 
and academic entities such as The New York Times, The Economist, Princeton University, The 
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Washington Post, and others. The Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections offers a comprehensive 
listing of all sources both on its website and within individual datasets.  
 The second political variable, Base_Count, is a count of all military bases residing within a 
given county’s borders. Since the boundaries of many military bases traverse the borders of two 
or more counties, all counties were included that had discernable amounts of land reserved for a 
given military base’s usage. This operationalization was utilized due to an inability to determine 
both the active entry and egress points of the base, and the nearby residency of active duty 
servicemembers and veteran as a result of the base’s current or former operational status. 
Multiple sources were utilized to produce a county-level military base count, including the 
National Park Service’s (2017) Military Bases in the Continental United States Map Index and 
Continental United States Map, individual states’ county maps from Digital-Topo-Maps.com, 
and the manual process of identifying each military base according to its designated index 
number, interpreting each military base’s territory (indicated by the red areas marked on the 
map), and identifying the appropriate counties in which a military base’s territory traversed. 
 The first economic variable is derived from the VA’s General Description of Geographic 
Distribution of the Department of Veterans Affairs Expenditures (2017), which is prepared by 
the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Policy, Planning, and Preparedness. The 
VA_compensation_perCap variable is a county-level measurement of VA compensation and 
pension expenditures, which is divided by the coinciding U.S. Census County Characteristics 
Resident Population Estimates figures (2017). As an integral component of the veterans 
treatment court design, compensation expenditures data was utilized in lieu of the VA’s 
description for determining VTC eligibility: “When a person is arrested, police officers ask 
whether he or she is a Veteran. If so, the Veterans’ eligibility for Veterans Treatment Court and 
32 
 
for VA benefits is assessed”. The VA publishes and periodically updates a “General Description 
of Geographic Distribution of the Department of Veterans Affairs Expenditures” where further 
information may be found regarding descriptions, methodology, and data sources. 
 The second economic variable measures the county-level corrections expenditures per 
capita. Because VTCs are designed to be (among other things) diversionary programs to 
incarcerations, the examination of county corrections budgets may yield some insight into the 
role these budgets play in the adoption of a VTC. The Corrections_Expend_PerCap variable is 
derived from two U.S. Census Bureau reports. First, the line-item labeled “Correct-Total Exp”, 
falling under the subcategory of “Public Safety”, is extracted from the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2017) State & Local Government Finances Individual Unit Files that displays county-level 
figures. Secondly, the corrections figures are divided by their coinciding U.S. Census County 
Characteristics Resident Population Estimates figures, generating the standardized corrections 
expenditures per capita variable. The yearly U.S. Census State & Local Finances datasets varied 
in their completeness, averaging just over 1,740 counties’ worth of available figures and are 
provided in thousands of dollars. 
 An additional economic variable of Surplus_perCap is derived from county-level revenue 
and expenditures data gathered from U.S. Census State & Local Government Finances data, 
utilizing the Individual Unit Files10. Similar to the method used by Button and Schreckhise 
(2017), the total yearly county expenditures are subtracted from the total yearly county revenue, 
followed by the deduction of the coinciding corrections per capita to ensure mutual exclusivity of 
the two variables. Subtracting a county’s revenue from its expenditures offers a more 
standardized measure of a county’s yearly fiscal position. As before, these financial data 
                                                          
10 U.S. Census State & Local Government Finances data for 2013 and 2014 were formatted to 
pivot tables by Geoffrey Shook 
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averaged just over 1,740 counties’ worth per year, and are provided by the U.S. Census Bureau 
in thousands of dollars. The final economic variable included is a measure of the yearly county-
level unemployment rates among the civilian labor force. This Unemploy_rate variable is 
published yearly as a percentage by the Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics (2017).   
 The first social variable utilized, similar to that used by Button and Schreckhise (2017), is a 
demographic measure of state veteran population adjusted for total population; however, in this 
study the variable Vets_100 represents the number of veterans per 100 people within the county, 
which accounts for the inclusion of counties with populations of under 1000. Datasets from the 
VA’s General Description of Geographic Distribution of the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Expenditures were again utilized to generate county-level veteran populations. The values for 
this variable, reflective of the number of veterans per 100 people in the general population, are 
calculated by dividing the yearly veteran population figures by the coinciding U.S. Census 
County Characteristics Resident Population Estimates figures. For this study, the definition of a 
veteran is “a person who served in the active military, naval, or air service and who was 
discharged or released under conditions other than dishonorable”, which is provided by Title 38 
of the Code of Federal Regulations (Code of Federal Regulations 2008).   
 The next social variable is a demographic measure of the racial/ethnic composition of 
county populations. Once again data is drawn from the U.S. Census County Characteristics 
Resident Population Estimates figures. To generate the Race_ethnicity variable, the combined 
male and female Caucasian populations were divided by the coinciding total county population. 
This produces a ratio of Caucasian population to the entire county population; thus, to calculate 
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the combined minority population of a county, one would simply subtract the Caucasian ratio 
from 1.  
 Next, the inmate population of a county’s prison system is measured as a percentage of the 
rated prison capacity, utilizing the annual Prisoners Series survey and the periodic Census of 
Jails conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2017). This Prison_capacity variable divides 
the average daily population by the county’s rated capacity. To provide context, the average 
daily population includes all confined prisoners held beyond arraignment, typically exceeding 72 
hours; additionally, the Bureau of Justice Statistics defines rated capacity at “The number of beds 
or inmates assigned by a rating official to institutions within the jurisdiction” (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics 2017). The annual Prisoner’s survey averaged over 800 county respondents, while the 
Census of Jails included more than 2,900 county respondents. The annual prisoner’s survey is 
not conducted for years in which the Census of Jails is conducted. An additional crime-related 
variable measures a combination of county-level violent crime and property crime. Derived from 
the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2017), the variable 
Crime_100 divides the sum of violent and property crime per 100 people within the county.   
 Fifth, the Department of Veterans Affairs publishes a list of operating VA hospitals within 
the United States; therefore, and county hosting a VA hospital is assigned a value of “1” for the 
Co_va_hosp variable, and counties not hosting a VA hospital are assigned a value of “0”. This 
dichotomous variable is intended to measure the correlation between VA hospital location and 
VTC location. By design, VTCs coordinate with the VA to ensure program participants can 
utilize available veterans benefit resources as they navigate the VTC process; therefore, 




 The final social variable is a county-level measure of the per capita personal income. This 
mean value of individual-level income was preferable to utilizing a measure of median 
household income, as the number of household occupants will tend to vary. Data for the 
Income_perCap variable is derived from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2017), under the 
Department of Commerce. These datasets offered figures on total personal income, Census 
Bureau midyear (total) population estimates, and the subsequent per capita personal income 

















 What county-level factors account for the adoption of veteran treatment courts? As done by 
Button and Schreckhise (2017), this study estimates logit models to answer the given question. 
Longitudinal data between the years 2004 and 2014 was utilized to generate the dependent and 
independent variables for Table 3. Model 1, consisting of 47 U.S. states, excludes Alaska, 
Hawaii, and Virginia. Alaska and Hawaii are noncontiguous with any other U.S. state, Alaska’s 
usage of boroughs rather than counties, and Virginia’s prolific utilization of independent cities 
resulted in the exclusion of these three states from Model 1. The exclusion of these states is 
intended to provide a more accurate representation of the regional diffusion influence a border 
county hosting a VTC may have on a county’s decision to adopt a VTC of its own. For 
comparison, Model 2 includes Virginia. 
A National Analysis 
 Model 1, in addition to the border county variable, includes the political, economic, and 
social variables discussed in the previous chapter. Regarding the border county variable, the 
greater the proportion of border counties hosting a VTC, the more likely a county will be to 
adopt a VTC of its own. Among the two political variables, only the measure of military bases 
within a county’s borders is related to the likelihood that a county will adopt a VTC. At the 95% 
confidence internal, counties with one or more military bases traversing its borders are more 
likely to adopt a VTC than counties without a military base. Counties tending to vote for 
Republican House of Representative candidates are no more (or less) likely to adopt a VTC than 
counties tending to vote for a Democrat House candidate.  
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  Out of the four economic variables, only VA compensation and pension expenditures per 
capita are related to the likelihood that a county will adopt a VTC. Counties with higher per 
capita rates of reported VA compensation and pension expenditures are more likely to adopt a 
VTC at the 95% confidence interval. A county’s unemployment rate, correction expenditures per 
capita, and budgetary surplus per capita were no more or less likely to have a veterans treatment 
court. 
 As expected, the social variables offer some explanatory power. Among the social variables, 
veteran population, crime rates, personal income per capita, county minority population, and the 
presence of a VA hospital are related to the likelihood that a county will adopt a VTC. First, the 
smaller the proportion of veterans in the overall county population, the more likely a county will 
have a VTC. Second, crime rates are likely to be lower in a county that adopts a VTC than one 
that has not. Next, personal income per capita is likely to be higher in counties that adopt a VTC. 
Finally, counties with a higher proportion of minorities within the overall county population are 
more likely to adopt a VTC. 
 The coefficient for the veteran population variable in Model 1 generates unexpected results: 
counties with higher per capita veteran populations are actually less likely to adopt a veterans 
treatment court than counties with lower per capita veteran populations. Taking into 
consideration that the presence of military bases, VA hospitals, and higher rates of VA 
compensation and pension per capita spending indicated a higher likelihood of VTC adoption, 
the relationship between county veteran population and VTC adoption warrants further 





Time-series Logit Results 
  Model 1 Model 2 
 
Coef. z p>|z| Coef. z p>|z| 
Border VTC 45.46 39.51 0.000*** 38.44 40.39 0.000*** 
Political 
      Military Base Presence 1.79 4.01 0.000*** 1.51 3.76 0.000*** 
House of 
Representatives vote 
margin -0.07 -0.14 0.890 -0.30 -0.06 0.547 
Economic 
      % Unemployment 0.05 0.86 0.388 0.07 1.30 0.192 
VA compensation per 
capita 28.79 18.83 0.000*** 25.31 16.35 0.000*** 
Surplus per capita -0.03 -0.12 0.901 0.00 0.00 0.998 
Corrections 
expenditures per capita 0.09 0.24 0.808 0.05 0.13 0.900 
Social 
      Veterans per 100 -1.64 -12.64 0.000*** -1.39 -12.68 0.000*** 
Crime per 100 -0.76 -3.00 0.003** -0.69 -2.99 0.003** 
VA hospital presence 8.49 9.00 0.000*** 6.56 5.46 0.000*** 
% Prison capacity 0.17 0.31 0.760 0.14 0.27 0.784 
Income per capita 0.00 12.75 0.000*** 0.00 10.45 0.000*** 
Race/ethnicity -5.97 -3.02 0.003** -3.89 -1.96 0.050 
Constant -30.35 -13.00 0.000*** -27.17 -11.13 0.000*** 










 Log likelihood   -1324.01     -1337.49   
   
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
 
Analyses of Select States 
 Ten states were selected for individual analysis, again estimating logit models. These ten 
states include: California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Texas. States were selected according to criteria conducive to individual 
analyses, including number of counties, number of VTCs, and regional diversity. Table 4 
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displays the relationship of each of the ten states’ key significant independent variables to the 
dependent variable. The relationships of independent variables are consistent across the ten states 
when significant. Veteran Affairs compensation and pension expenditures was significant for 
each of the ten states.  Among the ten states, only Florida’s measure of diffusion was 
insignificant. As well, only Michigan’s per capita personal income was insignificant. Remaining 
significant variables among the ten states are varied. 
Table 4 
Summary Table of Key Independent Variable Relationships to the Dependent Variable for 
Ten Select States 
  Key Independent Variables 








cap Income Race 
CA +     + -     +   
FL       + - +   +   
GA + +   +       +   
IL + +   +   + + +   
MI +     + -       - 
MN +     + - +   +   
MO +     +   +   +   
NY + +   +       + - 
PA +   + +       +   











Discussion and Conclusion 
Discussion 
 As stated by Button and Schreckhise (2017), VTCs are a recent phenomenon that caught on 
quickly. The Anchorage, Alaska VTC, perhaps the earliest known court of its kind, maintaining a 
municipal jurisdiction that only recently began accepting felony cases. Since the inception of 
Judge Russell’s Erie County VTC in 2008, these specialized treatment courts have spread to at 
least 328 counties within a 6-year time span. As more VTCs continue to open their doors, a 
greater understanding of the conditions accounting for the adoption of new VTCs may provide 
insight for localities considering adoption.   
 As was the case in Button and Schreckhise’s examination of state-level VTC diffusion, 
political partisanship does not appear to play a role as framed by House of Representative 
election results at the county-level. The relative consistency of partisanship’s less-than-
significant role in the adoption of VTCs may be indicative of generalized bipartisan support for 
the VTC concept. Categorized as a political variable for their national security application, the 
significance of military base presence suggests that areas permeated by military culture are more 
likely to find utility in VTC adoption. 
 An examination of county economic positioning yields varied results from those found by 
Button and Schreckhise. First, as was the case at the state-level, per capita VA compensation and 
pension expenditures at the county level are a significant factor in the decision to adopt the VTC 
concept. This result is expected, as VTCs partnering with VA healthcare facilities often require 
veteran offenders to be VA healthcare eligible for acceptance into the treatment program. 
Although Button and Schreckhise found that correction expenditures and tighter government 
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budgets were significant to state-level VTC adoption, these two variables’ lack of significance at 
the county-level may indicate a greater state-level emphasis on cost-effective, problem-solving 
innovations such as the VTC concept. Further study may clarify if VA compensation and 
pension expenditures, covering some or all participant program costs, are sufficient in reducing a 
county’s budgetary concerns. 
 Social variables utilized in Model 1’s analysis yielded results of mixed expectations. 
Categorized as a social variable, the presence of a VA hospital was significant to VTC adoption, 
further demonstrating the critical partnership established between the VA and local courts in 
implementing the VTC concept. The significant trend in which VTCs are more likely to be 
adopted in higher-income communities with a higher proportion of minority populations may be 
indicative of (primarily) urban VTC and VA hospital settings. Results from Model 1 indicate 
negative relationships between VTC adoption and both county crime rates and the proportional 
veteran population. The county-level relationship between VTC adoption and veteran population 
is inconsistent with Button and Schreckhise’s findings, and may once again be indicative of the 
country’s federal system of national, state, and local power.   
 While a state’s VTC adoption decision is more likely among states with a higher proportion 
of veterans to the overall population (Button and Schreckhise 2017), a given county’s attributes 
may not be representative of its parent state. The location of a VA hospital, shown to influence 
county-level adoption of VTCs, may be decided according to criteria inconsistent with the 
variables selected for this research. As an example, the Veterans Healthcare System of the 
Ozarks (2017), located in Fayetteville, Arkansas serves “veterans living in and visiting 23 
counties in Northwest Arkansas, southwest Missouri and eastern Oklahoma.” VTCs benefitting 
from a partnership with local VA hospitals may be more inclined to follow the money as a trade-
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off to taking up roots among the densest veteran populations. In the case of Northwest Arkansas, 
three area counties, Benton, Washington, and Madison, ranked 54th, 75th, and 67th respectively in 
veteran population per capita among 75 Arkansas counties as of 2014. The question then may be, 
do stakeholders considering the adoption of a new VTC find more social utility in partnering 
with VA hospitals and local rehabilitative programs, as opposed to the sheer volume of potential 
clients within the densest veteran populations? Future research may benefit from an exploration 
of the decision-making process behind the selection of a VA hospital location, which may 
involve a number of stakeholders from various levels of government. 
Limitations 
 A discussion regarding the limitations of this research begins with the collection of county-
level data. Source data for this research originates from a variety of institutions, all utilizing their 
own data collection and publication methods. As well, the federalist nature of American 
government greatly limits the uniformity in which data are reported. A county’s cooperation with 
national data collection efforts may be dependent on a number of factors, including state-level 
intervention. As a result, several research limitations must be addressed. 
 This research is focused at the county level, limiting the scope of included U.S. territory. 
The District of Columbia and other non-state U.S. territories, not qualifying as county 
equivalents, were excluded from this study. While Alaska’s boroughs and Virginia’s many 
independent cities rendered these two states ineligible for inclusion in this study, Louisiana’s 
parishes demonstrate county equivalent behavior deemed fitting for inclusion. Nevada’s Carson 
City, Maryland’s Baltimore City, and Missouri’s St. Louis City were categorized across multiple 
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data sources as independent cities, and were therefore excluded from the dataset. As well, three 
individual counties were excluded due to their inconsistent inclusion across various data sources. 
 A central limitation of this research is the inconsistency found among the many data sources 
utilized. For example, per capita personal income was calculated using U.S. Census Bureau 
midyear population estimates (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2017), while county resident 
population estimates for race/ethnicity were based on decennial U.S. Census data in which some 
individuals may report more than one race (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). As well, multiple data 
sources were published in a manner that resulted in 2 or more lines of data for a single county. 
These multiple lines of data were summed, creating a single data point as needed. Lastly, the 
most obvious inconsistency among county-level data sources involved missing data. The amount 
of missing data and associated counties varied; therefore, to estimate logit models with a strongly 
balanced dataset, a multiple imputation technique via Amelia’s bootstrapping-based algorithms 
was employed. This program is said to not change any relationships in the data; however, it’s 
essential function involves the estimation of missing data. 
 Limitations regarding this study’s diffusion and political variables are also noteworthy. 
First, collection of data regarding the presence of border counties hosting a VTC was limited to 
border counties residing within a given state. This manual data collection process would be 
greatly compounded by considerations for border counties residing in neighboring states; 
therefore, the ratio defining the border county variable is restricted to state-internal measurement. 
Second, the “County_HOR” variable is inherently limited to the 2-year cycle in which national 
House of Representative elections are held nationwide. Based on this uniform limitation, non-
election year data was cloned from the previous year’s election data. Finally, the “Base_count” 
variable data was also collected through manual efforts. The National Park Service’s Military 
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Base map limited the determination of a base’s traversing county borders to the researcher’s 
visual confirmation. If a visual confirmation could not be made, the default selection was to 
consider the base as not traversing the county’s border. Considerations for The Defense Base 
Realignment and Closure Act of 1990 were not included in the creation of this variable, as no 
evidence was found to generalize a base closing’s impact on adjacent communities. 
 A final limitation involves the collection of dependent variable data. Collecting data on the 
year in which a county adopted VTC, based on the commencement of the court docket’s 
operations, utilized multiple sources. Previously mentioned data sources occasionally came into 
conflict. For a scenario in which multiple online local news publications were located and not in 
agreement, the most frequently stated time reference was utilized. Scenarios in which multiple 
types of sources came into conflict, such as an online local news publication and a state court 
coordinator, the source providing the greatest level of detail regarding the commencement of 
operations was utilized. 
Conclusions 
 Conclusions draw about the diffusion of VTCs at the county-level are two-fold. First, the 
county-level climate of political partisanship does not appear to hold significant influence on the 
proliferation of the VTC phenomenon. In line with Button and Schreckhise (2017), political 
partisanship’s lack of statistical significance raises the question: “could it be that the social 
construction of justice-involved veterans regards them as deserving, on the high-side political 
power?” This research posits a slightly less deserving, lesser powered justice-involved veteran.  
Collectively, the remaining conclusions will attempt to add clarity to this postulation. 
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 A second conclusion drawn from this research combines the influence (or lack of influence) 
of employed economic and social variables. Beginning with economic factors, this research finds 
that per capita VA compensation and pension expenditures exert significant influence on the 
adoption of VTCs at both the state (Button and Schreckhise 2017) and county-level. Veteran 
Affairs compensation benefits have expanded to incorporate alternative treatment methods for 
mental health needs, inspired by a series of federal court cases expanding coinciding veteran 
rights. It appears then, that the VA’s federal-level support positions veterans as highly deserving 
and high-powered; however, states have not been mandated to adopt the VTC innovation. 
Instead, state-level diffusion of the VTC innovation has occurred over time, with four states yet 
to open their own VTC. Button and Schreckhise find that the financial returns on investment do 
matter at the state level, while this appears less so at the county level. Further research may 
reveal the role of VA compensation and pension payments for county-level returns on 
investment regarding VTC adoption. These contrasting trends may indicate a slightly diminished 
veteran social construction from that found at the federal level.   
 Finally, social factors combine with the economic to illuminate the social utility of VTCs. 
This study finds that counties with a lower proportion of veterans among the overall county 
population are more likely to adopt their own VTC. Instead, other factors contribute significantly 
to county-level VTC adoption, including the presence of a VA hospital within county borders. 
The combination of factors contributing significantly to county-level VTC adoption, not 
including veteran population, may indicate a pattern of diminished social construction, highest at 
the federal level and lowest at the local level. In addition to the posited top-down trajectory of 
diminishing justice-involved veteran social construction, the significance of crime rate and 
socioeconomic status on the county-level adoption of the VTC phenomenon appears to support 
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the hypothesis of this paper. In the spirit of nemo resideo, counties tend to gravitate towards 
VTC adoption when conditions are favorable for the enhanced social utility of serving veterans 
in need through innovative, cost-effective programs that provide some measure of returns on 
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